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"SHOVELS FIRST AND LAWYERS LATER":1 A COLIIoN COURSE
FOR CERCLA CLEANUPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS CLuIS
GREGORY M. ROMANO*
In the aftermath of "Love Canal"2 and in anticipation of Reagan
Administration environmental policies,3 a Democratic Congress and outgoing
President Carter enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980' ("CERCLA") with the purpose of
designating and cleaning up hazardous waste sites immediately and
determining liabilities later.5 The primary liability to be determined under
CERCLA is who must fund the cleanup of the hazardous waste site.6 One
form of liability not addressed by the statute, nor by many commentators, is
who is liable for environmental tort claims brought for damages under state
nuisance and trespass laws that stem from site remediation procedures
pursuant to CERCLA regulations. The issue presents a party facing potential
CERCLA liability with a great deal of uncertainty in deciding whether to
volunteer to clean up a CERCLA site and whether to settle claims brought
under state tort law.7 This Note discusses the inherent conflict between
CERCLA and state tort claims when a private party is ordered by the
Mr. Romano received his B.A. from the College of William and Mary in 1991 with a
double concentration in economics and government, and expects to receive his J.D. from the
College of William and Mary School of Law in May of 1997.
' DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S Toxic
POLICY FOR THE 1990'S 29 (1992) (quoting Ann 0. Bowman).
2 "Love Canal" refers to the well-documented tragedy in Niagara Falls, New York, where
a neighborhood and schools built on top of a landfill containing 20,000 tons of over 200
types of chemical waste, resulted in health problems for neighborhood residents, evacuation
of 1,004 households, and a $30 million government "buy out" for those living nearby. See
id. at3.
' See Ian G. John, Note, Too Much Waste. A Proposal for Change in the Government's
Effort to Clean Up the Nation, 70 IND. L.J. 951, 954 (1995).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
'See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 1, at 27-3 0.
6 See generally Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on
the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1046-48
(1994). Liability under CERCLA is the subject of much scholarly interpretation. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfeild, CERCLA Liability for Hazardous Waste
"Generators ": How Far Does Liability Extend?, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 33 (1990).
7 See Organ, supra note 6, at 1043-44. -
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Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to use certain methods to clean
up a site and where those methods result in tort claims. The goal of this Note
is to create policy incentives to ensure that toxic tort victims receive equitable
compensation while hazardous waste cleanups are conducted more efficiently
than under the current system.
Part I of this Note provides a review of CERCLA remediation and
liability, as well as state environmental tort law. Part II examines CERCLA
and tort liability when the EPA takes over a site to clean up hazardous waste.
This part pays particular attention to tort liability for the private landowner
and the EPA when the EPA, or its contractor, cleans up the site in a negligent
fashion. Part III considers liability issues when a private party cleans up the
site under an administrative order from the EPA or through a consent
settlement entered with the EPA and approved by a federal district court. The
section primarily analyzes whether CERCLA has any preemptive effect on
state tort laws based on the EPA's role in selecting the remedy necessary to
clean up the site if the tort claim is based on the cleanup methodology. This
third part considers whether Congress intended courts to create federal law
to address issues such as preemption, and, if so, whether sufficient conflict
exists to warrant preemption and whether a preemptive "federal interest" is
at stake. Part IV analyzes a proposal to reform CERCLA and proposes
amendments allowing tort claims against the EPA for inadequate hazardous
waste remedy selection and implementation. The proposal would change the
system to create more incentives for private parties to enter into results-
oriented consent decrees and would place a greater reliance on tort claims for
victim compensation. Recognized in the solution, although not universally
accepted, is the conclusion from Part III that tort claims are preempted by
CERCLA to the extent that they are based on inadequate remedial procedures
mandated by the EPA. The proposal would allow for the allocation of tort
liability for hazardous waste claims when the cause of the tort is a
combination of improper cleanup and improper disposal of the hazardous
waste.
I. BACKGROUND ON CERCLA AND ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LAW
A. CERCLA Cleanup Process
CERCLA creates a system to identify and clean up any actual or
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threatened release8 of a hazardous substance 9 that poses an "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment."' The statute imposes joint and several" strict liability 2 for
certain costs and damages on whom it classifies as "potentially responsible
parties" ("PRPs"). 13 There are three categories of PRPs: 14 the owner or
operator of the facility at the time of disposal and the owner or operator at the
present time;' 5 the person who arranged for disposal and treatment; 6 and the
person who transported the hazardous waste or who accepted hazardous
waste for transportation. 7 PRPs can be held strictly liable for: (1) all
8 "Release" is defined to include "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment," with exceptions for certain substances emitted at workplaces, from motor
vehicles, and nuclear releases. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
9 "Hazardous substance" includes pollutants listed under the Solid Waste Disposal Act
("SWDA"), the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), the Toxic
Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), and threshold amounts of additional substances added
by the EPA regulation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a). See id. § 9601(14) (the Clean Water
Act is cited by reference to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1994)).
I ld. § 9606(a).
Joint and several liability is not mandatory under CERCLA, but it is generally seen as
a presumption under the holding of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Ohio 1983). This was reenforced by the legislative history behind the amendments
to CERCLA. See Organ, supra note 6, at 1069-70.
12 Although no CERCLA provision uses the term "strict liability," there is a consensus
among courts and commentators that strict liability applies to PRPs based on statutory
construction and legislative history. See Organ, supra note 6, at 1047 n.20.
"3 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Additional CERCLA funding comes from an $8.5 billion
"Hazardous Substance Superfund" financed by taxes on oil, chemical feedstocks, and
corporate profits. See id. § 961 1(a).
"4 See id. § 9607(a).
15 See id. § 9607(a)(1), (2).
lb See id. § 9607(a)(3).
'7 See id. § 9607(a)(4).
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response, removal and remedial 8 action costs; 9 (2) damages for injury to or
destruction of or loss of natural resources including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury;2° (3) destruction or loss resulting from such a release;
and (4) costs of any health assessment or health effects 21 (collectively called
"CERCLA costs and damages"). Defenses to strict liability under CERCLA
are limited to an act of God,2 2 an act of war,23 and the act or omission of a
third party other than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
a contractual relationship with the defendant.24  A contract transferring
ownership of land removes the third party defense for a defendant who
acquired the land after the disposal unless he can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that at the time he acquired the facility he did
not know, and had no reason to know, that any hazardous substance was
disposed at the facility.25 Thus, a landowner can be strictly liable as a PRP
for pollution released many years earlier even if the pollution was released
according to different legal and industrial standards as long as he should have
18 "Removal" refers to the actions taken in the cleanup of released hazardous substances
to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances,
disposal of removed material, and other actions taken as necessary to minimize short term
danger. See id. § 9601(23). "Remedial action" is the procedure used for permanently
removing any present or future dangers to public health or welfare or the environment by
preventing any future release of hazardous substances. See id. § 9601(24). The key
difference between the two is that removal is concerned with immediate danger while
remediation includes procedures for a long-term solution.
"9 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). Liability attaches whether the EPA or a private party
conducted the cleanup. See id.
20 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
21 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(D). Liability under this provision is capped at $50 million for
owner/operators and by formulas for particular facilities and vessels. See id. § 9607(c). The
cap is not applicable if the hazardous release was the result of willful misconduct or willful
negligence, if the primary cause was negligence in operating standards or a failure to
cooperate with public officials. See id. § 9607(c)(2). A person also may be liable for
punitive damages of three times the amount of damages and costs established in § 9607(a).
See id. § 9607(c)(3).
22 See id. § 9607(b)(1).
23 See id. § 9607(b)(2).
4See id. § 960-7(b)(3). To utilize this defense, a defendant must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance involved
and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
foreseeable consequences of such acts or omissions. See id.
25 Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i). The party also must establish the due care required in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3). See id. § 9601(35)(A).
[Vol. 21:421
"SHOVELS FIRST AND LAWYERS LATER"
known that the site contained some amount of hazardous waste.26
The cleanup process proceeds as follows. The EPA places a site on
the National Priorities List ("NPL") if it poses a release threat mandating
long-term remedial evaluation and response.27 A Remedial Investigation
("RI") is then conducted to determine the extent of the contamination.28 A
Feasibility Study ("FS") follows to evaluate remediation and create site
management alternatives based on the RI. 29 The goals of the RI/FS process
are to determine what contaminants are present, determine the level of
dispersement in the environment, develop a list of potential cleanup method
alternatives, and use computer modeling to predict potential effects that each
alternative could present.3" The EPA considers the remedy alternatives
presented in the RI/FS according to nine factors: health protectiveness;
compliance with relevant laws and standards; long-term effectiveness and
permanence; reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume through treatment;
short-term effectiveness; implementability; cost; state acceptance; and
community acceptance.3 The EPA issues a Record of Decision ("ROD")
that outlines a proposed remedial plan consisting of the Remedial Design
("RD") and Remedial Action ("RA").32 The ROD specifically selects a
remedial method from the RI/FS for the site that provides adequate protection
of public health, welfare, and the environment.33
The EPA implements the ROD in one of three ways. First, the EPA
can take over the site and hire a contractor to conduct the cleanup.34 When
the EPA takes over a site, it can sue PRPs to recover for CERCLA costs and
26 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1446 (E.D. Cal.
1995).
27 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1995).
28 See id. § 300.430(d).
29 See id. § 300.430(e).
30 See Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29
U. RICH. L. REv. 581, 586 (1995).
3 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii). EPA discretion to consider these factors was left in
place when CERCLA was amended in 1986 by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), but the
EPA was provided with more detailed guidance and standards and given the message that
health and environmental risks were to take precedence over costs. See MAZMANIAN &
MORELL, supra note 1, at 40.
32 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f).
3 See id.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994).
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damages provided that the cleanup methods are not inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). 5  Second, the EPA can issue a
Unilateral Administrative Order ("UAO") to a PRP requiring that the PRP
clean up a site using methods specified in the ROD.36 PRP non-compliance
cpm result in penalties of up to $25,000 a day and treble damages.37 Third, the
EPA can enter into a settlement with the PRP38 for the PRP to remediate the
site through procedures specified in a consent decree that were selected from
the alternatives presented in the ROD. 39 Before entering into the settlement,
the EPA must determine that the PRP will conduct the action properly and
promptly.4° The settlement does not reflect acknowledgment by the party that
the release constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health, welfare, or the environment. 41 Any person who enters into
such an agreement may sue other PRPs who do not enter into settlements
with the EPA for recovery costs involved in the cleanup.42
The EPA published a Model Consent Decree to be used as the basis
for these settlement agreements. 43 The EPA maintains complete oversight
authority throughout the RD/RA process.44 CERCLA provides for limited
5 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). The EPA was required to publish the NCP after notice and
comment rulemaking on appropriate methods and standards for cleanup. See id. § 9605.
In addition, it was required to specify procedures and standards for responding to the release
of hazardous substances. See id. § 9605(a). These include proper methods for discovering,
investigating, evaluating, and remedying releases or threats of releases that pose substantial
danger to the environment. See id.
36 See id. § 9606(a). The PRP can seek reimbursement for recovery costs incurred in the
cleanup from other PRPs. See id. § 9607(a).
37 See id. § 9606(b)(1).
3 The EPA also may enter into a settlement with any other person including the present
landowner. See id. § 9622(a).
39 See id. The EPA also may settle with the PRP early enough in the process for the PRP
to conduct the RI/FS itself. See id.
40 See id. § 9604(a)(1).
" See id. § 9622(d)(1)(B).
42 See id. § 9607(a). The PRPs who enter into the agreements cannot be held liable for
contribution regarding matters addressed by the settlement. See id. § 9622(g)(5).
43 Revised Model CERCLA RD/RA Consent Decree, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (1995).
14 The EPA must approve the remedial design and remedial action plans continually during
the process including preliminary, intermediate, and pre-final/final submittals. See id. at
38,823-27. Remedial plans must include design criteria, treatability study results, field
sampling and pre-design work results, project delivery strategy, preliminary plans, drawing
sketches, specifications, and the construction schedule. See id. at 38,823. The EPA also
must approve Remedial Action Work Plans that may include: completion schedules,
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citizen and state participation in the remedy selection and settlement
processes but stays such activity once a cleanup commences until it is
completed.45 Citizen and state involvement takes many forms. The EPA
must provide opportunity for public comment on the ROD and any
subsequent proposed changes to it.46 Citizens may bring civil suits against
any person or the government for violating any provision of CERCLA.47
State governments also have the opportunity to review and comment on the
studies conducted on the site48 and the proposed remedy.49 States are entitled
selection methods for the contractor, methodology for ground water monitoring and
operation plans, and procedures and plans for decontamination of equipment and disposal
of contaminated materials. See id. at 38,824. The EPA must approve selections and changes
in the supervising contractor hired by the PRP. See id. at 38,823.
The most relevant aspect of the consent decree is the role that the EPA maintains
in the remedy selection. At least every five years, the EPA may request any studies and
investigations to conduct reviews of whether the remedial action is protective of human
health and the environment. See id. at 38,825. In fact, the EPA may determine at any time
that the remedial action is not protective of human health and the environment and select
further response actions for the site. See id. Access to the site must be provided at any
reasonable time for the EPA or its contractor to monitor the work; verify any data or
information; conduct investigations relating to contamination at or near the site; obtain
samples; assess need for additional response actions; inspect records, logs, and contracts; and
assess settling defendants compliance with the consent decree. See id. at 38,825-26.
PRPs also are involved in a continuous exchange with the EPA through the monthly
progress reports they must provide. See id. at 38,825. The monthly reports must contain
summaries of all results of sampling and other tests; identify all work plans completed and
submitted; describe all actions including data collection and implementation of work plans
and provide other information relating to the progress of construction; include information
regarding percentage of completion and unresolved delays encountered or anticipated that
may affect the future schedule for implementation of the work; include schedule
modifications; and describe activities undertaken in support of the Community Relations
Plan. See id. at 38,826. Project coordinators must be named by both the PRP and the EPA,
and the two coordinators must meet at least once a month. See id. at 38,827.
4 See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990).
46See 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a). The EPA is required to provide a reasonable opportunity for
the public to submit written and oral comments regarding the proposed remedy. See id. §
9617(a)(2).
7 See id. § 9659(a).
4 See id. § 9621(f)(1)(E). States can comment on the data used in the RI/FS to evaluate
the remedial action proposals, the engineering design resulting from the selection of the
planned remedial action, and other technical data relating to the implementation of a remedy.
See id.
9 See id. § 9621(f)(1)(G).
19971 427
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
to participate in settlement negotiations with private parties on potential
consent decrees,5" but the EPA can settle without a state's concurrence." The
state may challenge the remedy in the consent decree if the state believes that
it violates standards required under state law 52 or if it believes that the
cleanup is not in compliance with the RA."
B. Environmental Tort Law
Hazardous waste problems that lead to CERCLA remedies and
liability often raise state environmental tort issues because CERCLA
purposely avoids providing compensation for victims and affected property
owners. 4 Unfortunately, the relationship between traditional state tort
remedies and CERCLA cleanups is not fully resolved. Examples of large-
scale settlements of environmental tort claims stemming from hazardous
waste ultimately cleaned up under CERCLA include tort suits for medical
and economic harm by 280 residents in the "Three Mile Island" nuclear
disaster, a $20 million "Love Canal" settlement for 1,300 former and current
residents, and a $400,000 settlement for a Chevron McColl dumping site to
seventy-eight families in Fullerton, California. 5 Typical environmental tort
cases involve claims of nuisance and/or trespass with some basis in
negligence or strict liability. 6 Nuisance law is a frequently litigated
environmental tort, particularly when there are injuries arising from water or
SO See id. § 962 1(f)(I)(F).
5' See id. § 9621(f)(2)(C).
See id. § 962 1(d)(2)(A). A state can challenge a remedy in federal court if it violates a
state environmental standard, called an "applicable or relevant and appropriate requirement"
("ARAR"). See id. § 9621(f)(2)(B). However, a court can accept a waiver of the ARAR if
the remedy selection is supported by "substantial evidence." See United States v. Akzo
Coatings of America, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 571, 583 (E.D. Mich. 1989), aft'd, 949 F.2d 1409
(6th Cir. 1991) (applying "arbitrary and capricious review" to allow an amendment of an
ROD to allow for soil flushing method despite a state challenge that the method violated
state ground water antidegredation laws). Often the determination of whether the remedy
complies with the ARAR can only be made at the completion of the remedy. See, e.g., id.
at 586.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f).
54 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 1, at 45.
" See id. at 45-46.
56 See SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP,
LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 17.01[1][b] (1995). Because each state has its own tort law,
this Note considers the coverage of this law in a general fashion.
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soil pollution. 7 Nuisance actions can be brought publicly" 8 or privately,
prospectively or after the interference with property commences.' Generally,
a plaintiff in a nuisance claim must prove five elements: interference with
use and enjoyment of land; possessory interest by the plaintiff in the land
affected; creation of the nuisance by the defendant;6' substantial harm that
comes from the interference with the land; and that the defendant meets the
state's requisite liability standard.6 2 Depending on the jurisdiction, the
conduct required in the last element is usually grouped as: intentional and
unreasonable; negligent,63 reckless, or abnormally dangerous; or based on
strict liability.6' A typical nuisance suit is one that stems out of a toxic site
that leaches contamination of a hazardous substance, such as oil or
plutonium, into soil or ground water on the property of another and causes
either personal injury or decreases property value.65  Trespass suits are
generally brought as companion claims in nuisance suits, 66 but they are much
less likely to be successful because trespass is based on an intentional
57 See id.
58See id. § 17.01[2][a]. The suit is usually brought by a state or municipal representative
for abatement or recovery of costs from an interference with a right common to the general
public. See id.
" See id. The suit is a "civil action for damages or for abatement of an interference with
use and enjoyment of land caused by the defendant's conduct." Id.
60 See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981).
61 At minimum, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant contributed significantly to the
nuisance, such as disposing of hazardous waste on property belonging to someone else. See
COOKE, supra note 56, § 17.01[2][b][iii].62 See id. § 17.01[1][a]-.01[2][d].
63 Some states provide that a violation of specific federal or state environmental statutes
constitutes "negligence per se" in determining culpability under nuisance. See id. §
17.01 [4] [b] [iii][B]. Violation of a CERCLA order would be "negligence per se" in these
jurisdictions, although the unique nature of CERCLA does not mandate that any PRP be
considered "negligent per se" because being a PRP does not alone constitute a violation of
federal law. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
64 See COOKE, supra note 56, § 17.01[2][b][v][B][ii]-.01[2][b][v][B][iii][E].
65 See id. § 17.01[2][b][i]. An example of a typical nuisance suit is where a court holds
that an intrusion of volatile organic compounds ("VOCs") into well water constitutes a
private nuisance. See Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 476 N.W.2d 593 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
6 See, e.g., Fortier, 476 N.W.2d at 608 (holding that VOCs constituted a trespass as well).
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invasion of property.67
This information on CERCLA and nuisance law provides a
background to consider the conflict that exists when a nuisance claim could
be created by an EPA-mandated CERCLA cleanup that involves a negligent
selection or implementation of a remedy but that cannot be challenged until
the remedy is complete.
II. TORT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT REMEDIATION BY THE EPA
When the EPA takes over a site and hires a contractor to conduct a
hazardous waste site cleanup,68 a person may be injured by sickness resulting
from an interference with his land that would not have occurred absent a
negligent remedy selection by the EPA or negligent implementation by the
EPA's contractor. Potential remedies include suing the EPA, the contractor,
or the landowner.
A. EPA and Contractor Tort Liability
Congress waived governmental immunity for certain tort claims69
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").70 However, under the
"discretionary acts exception" of the FTCA,7 1 the government 72 or its agent
cannot be held liable for a tort claim if the challenged government action
involves an element ofjudgment or choice and if the challenged government
action is based on considerations of public policy.73 In this context, the
question becomes whether SARA limited enough of the discretion originally
67 See COOKE, supra note 56, § 17.01[3][a]. Nuisance suits for environmental claims
usually stem from indirect invasions or a "percolation of injurious substances onto the land,"
rather than intentional entries onto a plaintiff s land. See id.68 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994). Before filing a claim under the FTCA, the party must give
the EPA sufficient notice for it to value and settle the claim first. See Laurence v. United
States, No. C-93-0381-DLJ, 1993 WL 266657, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 1993) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2675).
70 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.
71 Id. § 2680(a).
72 The government can be held liable for the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government who was acting within the scope of his office. See id. §
1346(b). The scope of his office does not include illegal acts. See id.
" See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988).
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granted to the EPA in CERCLA to remove liability protection.74
In Richland-Lexington Airport District v. Atlas Properties, Inc.,75 the
court conclusively held that CERCLA grants the EPA discretion with respect
to cleanup of contaminated sites. 76 The EPA's Model Consent Decree for
settlement agreements, however, may run counter to the requirement for
immunity that there be no "federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribing a course of action" for the EPA to follow. 7 Although the model
allows EPA officials to use the model for "guidance" only and permits them
to choose either the most recent model consent decree or previous ones, 78 the
model itself does not address remedy selection. The guidelines for remedy
selection promulgated under SARA, however, provide some fairly specific
alternatives. 79 Nonetheless, they leave discretion to the EPA to determine
whether a proposed remedy presents any hazard to human health.8 ° For
example, the guidelines require that detailed factual findings be made before
selecting an appropriate remedial approach.8" Once a remedy is selected, it
also must comply with cleanup standards in the guidelines.82
A number of courts found that the discretionary acts exception applies
when EPA officials make decisions in cleanups where they exercise
discretion to weigh site-specific factors and determine the best way to meet
74 For example, Topol and Snow claim that "Congress took away the Agency's discretion
on many important issues and thus locked the EPA into a virtual enforcement
straightjacket." 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE
15 (1992).
"' 854 F. Supp. 400 (D.S.C. 1994).
76 See id. at 423 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9621); United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106,
1113-14 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
77 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; see also Revised Model CERCLA RD/RA Consent Decree,
60 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (1995).
78 See Revised Model CERCLA RD/RA Consent Decree, 60 Fed. Reg. at 38,819.
'9 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1995).
'0 See id.
"' See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 74, at 47. Previously the EPA was given the broad task
of determining remediation standards that were cost-effective and consistent with the
National Contingency Plan. See id.
82 See id.
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CERCLA's goals.83 In United States v. Skipper, 84 the court held that
"administrative decisions involving the cleanup and disposal of hazardous
waste are grounded in environmental, economic and social considerations,
and are just the sort of decisions the exception was designed to protect."85 As
long as EPA officials are making policy judgments based on resources and
protecting public health and safety, the exception applies.86 Thus, if the EPA
negligently selects a remedy for the cleanup of hazardous waste and, as a
result, someone is injured or property is damaged, the affected party cannot
sue the EPA under state tort law. The only remaining possible tort defendant
would be the current landowner of the property where the hazardous waste
was originally located, even though the landowner did not select the remedy.
Generally the EPA also cannot be held liable under the FTCA if an
independent contractor hired by the EPA negligently carries out its work
under the contract.87 In order to encourage contractors, called "response
action contractors" ("RAC"), to perform cleanup work, the EPA is permitted
to indemnify an RAC from any liability under federal law stemming from
non-negligent work88 and any tort claim for negligent work in carrying out
" See generally John F. Seymour, Liability of Government Contractors for Environmental
Damage, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 491 (1992). Seymour's article reviews a number of cases
where EPA officials implemented CERCLA cleanups. In one case, an on-site EPA
coordinator was considered to be acting in a discretionary function when he rejected a state
hydrogeologist's advice and scheduled remediation activities on days when air emissions
could be dangerous to workers. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837
F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988). As a result of the coordinator's
decision, a number of workers were seriously injured from a toxic cloud in the windy
conditions. See id. at 119. The official was held not liable because "the authority delegated
to the On-Scene Coordinator left room for, and indeed required, the exercise of policy
judgment based upon the resources available and the relative risks to the public health and
safety from alternative actions." Id. at 122. Similarly, in another case, a court found that,
because the statute did not mandate specific conduct for the EPA in cleaning up a scrapyard
contaminated by PCBs, the EPA could not be held liable for negligence in failing to mitigate
the problem or adequately warn neighbors. See Lockett v. United States, 938 F.2d 630 (6th
Cir. 1991).
84781 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
85 1d. at 1114.
86 Governmental sovereign immunity is also waived specifically in the CERCLA statute
but only to the extent that the federal government can be held liable for violating CERCLA
and not for state tort claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (1994).
87 See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-15 (1976).
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(a).
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the RA.89 Before the EPA can indemnify the RAC it must determine the
amount that the PRP may indemnify the RAC and only indemnify the
difference between adequate indemnification and the resources of the PRP.9 °
Thus, not only will a PRP possibly be held liable for negligent remedy
selection by the EPA, but it also will be liable for negligent implementation
of a remedy by an RAC to the extent that it is required to provide
indemnification.
B. EPA Liability for CERCLA Response Costs
An examination of EPA liability for CERCLA response costs when
it takes over a site, rather than other tort claims, reveals why this policy may
not make sense. A number of courts have extended EPA immunity to claims
for CERCLA response costs due to negligent cleanup efforts by the EPA.9'
A 1995 court decision persuasively rejected the reasoning behind these cases
and showed that the EPA waived the sovereign immunity it possessed from
the discretionary acts exception in the CERCLA statute.92
CERCLA provides that government agencies are to be treated as
"persons" under the Act.93 Another provision states that the United States
"shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to
the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title."94
The Supreme Court stated that this provision amounts to an unequivocal
waiver of sovereign immunity.95 Some courts differ, however, on whether
the EPA's takeover of a site converts the EPA into an "operator" for the
purposes of determining liability. If the EPA is considered to be an
"operator" of the site, then it can be liable for CERCLA response costs that
" See id. § 9619(c). However, the indemnification under the latter provision may not
extend to state claims based on strict liability. See Seymour, supra note 83, at 541.90See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(c)(5)(C)(i).
9' See, e.g., United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that the
counterclaims based on EPA removal action were barred by sovereign immunity); United
States v. Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (rejecting claims for
response costs based on EPA regulatory and cleanup activities).
92 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
9 Id. § 9620(a)(1). Section 9607 refers to liability under CERCLA as an owner/operator,
arranger, or transporter. Id. § 9607(a).
" See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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result from negligent acts.96 Although conceding that the EPA exercises
sufficient dominion and control over the operation of a facility that it takes
over in order to be considered an "operator," a number of courts have
concluded that the EPA should not be considered an "operator" because its
role in taking over a site is different than that of a private actor.97 These
courts claim that a private actor would not take over the site of someone
else's pollution and clean it up.98 United States v. Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc. , however, rejected this conclusion because CERCLA
encourages private cleanup of pollution caused by others by
exposing current owners to liability and at the same time
providing them with a cause of action for the recovery of their
costs. In many instances private remediators will be current
owners of property who had nothing to do with the creation
of the hazardous waste problem that they must respond to.
These private parties are not different in any significant
respect from a government agency acting in a remedial
capacity and CERCLA does not acknowledge such a
difference but treats them in the same way.' 0
Another point made by many courts is that imposing CERCLA
response cost liability on negligent government action shifts costs from PRPs
to the government. °' Again, however, the court in Iron Mountain Mines, Inc.
disposed of this point by reiterating that many PRPs are landowners who
became responsible for pollution released many years earlier when there were
different technical and industrial standards.0 2 The policy idea that the current
landowner would internalize the costs of pollution into business operations0 3
9 See Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1443-44 (giving an example where the
court interprets 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)).
" See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 790 F. Supp. 94, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1992);
United States v. Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725, 730 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
9' See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R., 790 F. Supp. at 97.
99 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
Id. at 1445 (citations omitted).
See Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 729.
112 Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1446; see also MAZMANIAN & MORELL,
supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the common landfill procedure in the post World War II era
was to fill a pit or ravine with industrial or household waste and then to cover and level it).
103 See United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md. 1991).
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does not always apply when the current landowner may not even have any
current business operations. °4 Further, no public policy considerations
justify internalizing the EPA's negligent cleanup activity.'0 5 Even the case
law above concedes that a PRP can avoid the EPA's attempt to collect
response costs if it can show that the effort was inconsistent with the
procedures that must be followed under the NCP.' °6 Negligent method
selection or implementation is inconsistent with the NCP. Thus these cases
hold that a PRP can refuse to pay costs to the EPA if it can show negligent
method selection, but that the same negligence cannot be used to require the
EPA to pay response costs that a PRP must incur under 42 U.S.C. §
9613(0(1) to make up for the EPA's negligence.'0 7
Proper interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) mandates that the
EPA may be held liable for contribution costs under CERCLA.'018 The
provision says that remediators can be held liable for CERCLA costs and
damages for a negligent cleanup.'0 9 Immunity from CERCLA costs and
damages is granted for those that conduct a cleanup of a site using NCP
procedures or that are under the direction of an approved on-scene
coordinator." 0 The provision is followed by this sentence: "This paragraph
shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as the result of negligence on
the part of such person.""' The court in Skipper held that this provision
meant that NCP compliance and approved on-scene supervision does not
foreclose state tort liability." 2 However, the court in Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc. argued that such statutory construction is a tortured reading of the
provision because it ignores the placement of the sentence and the phrase
"costs and damages." '113 As the court in Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. said,
"[S]urely the reference in the second sentence is to 'costs or damages' under
"0 See Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1446.
105 See id.
106 See, e.g., Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. at 729.
17 See Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1446 (evaluating the decision in United
States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D.N.C. 1991)).
108 See id. at 1447.
109 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (1994). Some potentially liable remediators include the EPA,
indemnified RACs, and PRPs. See id.
10 See id.
11 Id.
112 See United States v. Skipper, 781 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
13 Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1447.
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CERCLA and not state law, a subject never mentioned.""' 4  Further,
subsections 9607(d)(2) and 9607(d)(3), the only other subsections within
9607(d), deal with "costs or damages" for CERCLA, not state action."5
The other argument for providing the EPA with immunity for
misconduct and negligence is the rejection of a Senate amendment that would
have added such misconduct and negligence as a defense to CERCLA
liability."16 However, as the court in Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. made clear,
a PRP using EPA negligence as an absolute defense to PRP liability is very
different from the EPA trying to avoid any responsibility for negligent
cleanup efforts. 17 CERCLA envisions a wide scope of liability upon the
discovery of a hazard to provide incentives for parties to commence cleanup
quickly with the understanding that the party who conducted the cleanup will
be entitled to equitable reimbursement from responsible parties." 8 Liability
for costs and damages incurred throughout the cleanup process are allocated
based on respective fault and should include possible EPA liability for
negligent remedy selection or implementation. " 9
The Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. holding is limited to imposing
CERCLA response costs and does not address whether the EPA should be
found negligent under state tort law for negligent remedy selection or
implementation. The holding is instructive on two reasons why the EPA
should bear liability for any tort damage it causes someone else. First, when
the EPA takes over a site for cleanup, it controls the site as the
"owner/operator" and thus should bear responsibility for the cleanup. The
landowner loses control of his property under the power of federal law, and
thus cleanup mistakes are solely the work of the EPA. Second, the holding
stands for the broad proposition that the EPA should be liable for its mistakes
in remedy selection and implementation. CERCLA's willingness to waive
sovereign immunity for the importance of ensuring proper cleanup
procedures should be duplicated when faced with the importance of ensuring
that environmental tort victims are compensated by those responsible
regardless of the discretionary functions exemption to the FTCA. If it is
impossible to clean up the site without causing a nuisance to a neighbor, then
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 See Skipper, 781 F. Supp. at 1112.
117 See Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1448.
... See id. at 1432.
.. See id. at 1448-49.
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the court trying the state tort claim should attempt to apportion the fault to the
EPA and the private defendant responsible for the underlying hazardous
substance. Such a policy would deter dangerous cleanups and provide PRPs
with incentives to clean up sites themselves to avoid the high costs that the
EPA will incur in using safe, expensive cleanup methods to avoid liability.
The alternative of a plaintiff suing the PRP landowner for EPA negligence
is unfair, but in states where negligence is the culpability standard for
nuisance claims, a suit is possible if the plaintiff can show that the PRP
proximately caused the exposure. However, the unique nature of CERCLA
may prevent successful "negligence per se" suits against the PRP
landowner.120 Such a scenario leaves the injured person without a state
nuisance remedy. In states with a strict liability basis for nuisance law,
particularly related to the disposal of hazardous waste, a PRP landowner is
faced with tort liability for EPA negligence. Either result is flawed.
III. TORT LIABILITY WHEN A PRP PERFORMS THE CLEANUP
The question of environmental tort liability also exists for a PRP that
cleans up a hazardous site pursuant to methods in a ROD, either under a
UAO or pursuant to a consent decree entered into with the EPA.12' A state
"' See Gray v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 748, 755 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (refusing
to accept federal jurisdiction over a suit because CERCLA could not provide the basis for
a state tort claim as negligence per se unless the defendants failed to properly conduct any
proposed cleanup). If the EPA takes over the site without issuing a Unilateral
Administrative Order ("UAO") for the PRP to clean .up the site, then no CERCLA
"violation" exists on which to base a claim of negligence per se. See id.
12' See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. A PRP faces a number of considerations
regarding CERCLA costs and damages when deciding what to do when it receives a notice
of PRP classification. See generally Organ, supra note 6. If the PRP takes no action, it will
face four potential types of liability risks. See id. at 1065. First, if the EPA takes over the
site and cleans it up as discussed earlier in this Note, the PRP will be faced with joint and
several liability for CERCLA costs and damages. See id. Second, the EPA also may issue
an administrative order to the PRP to participate or face huge penalties. See id. Third,
another PRP may clean up the site, and the first PRP may risk being sued for contribution
from that PRP for CERCLA costs and damages. Fourth, by entering into the consent decree
the PRP faces other liability risks. See id. If it enters before or during the RI/FS, it does not
know which remedy the EPA will choose. See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 1, at 45.
However, at least the PRP will participate in the collection of data and the shaping of
alternate remedies to be chosen by the EPA. See John, supra note 3, at 972 n.148. Also,
because the EPA rarely considers equitable allocation among PRPs effectively, the settling
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tort claim may be preempted by an EPA consent decree or UAO in a number
of ways under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The Constitution
states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." 122 Federal preemption of state law under the Supremacy
Clause can occur in three instances: statutory prescription, direct conflict
between federal and state law, or an area involving "uniquely federal
interests.123
A. Statutory Prescription
An examination of the CERCLA statute reveals that Congress never
specifically addressed whether a PRP can be held liable for a state tort claim
for injuries stemming from a cleanup. The statute clearly envisions a role for
state law in hazardous cleanup because it states, in a "savings clause," that
"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any
State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to
the release of hazardous substances within such State.' 24 The statute does
not preempt state tort claims for. personal or property injury caused by
hazardous waste released before any cleanup begins. 25 Validity of state
PRP likely will bear a disproportionate share of response costs even if the EPA selects a
remedy that the PRP supports. See Organ, supra note 6, at 1067. The incentives for the PRP
to enter into the consent decree are to have an influence in the determination of liability, to
avoid being sued by the EPA, and to avoid being sued for CERCLA costs and damages on
matters covered by the consent decree with other PRPs. See id. at 1066.
122 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
124 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994). Another CERCLA provision also is relevant. Section
96070) specifies that
[n]othing in this paragraph shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liability of any person under any other provision of State
or Federal law, including common law, for damages, injury, or loss
resulting from a release of any hazardous substance or for removal.., of
such hazardous substance.
Id. § 96070).
125 See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 651, 657
(N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648-49
(3d Cir. 1988) (holding that CERCLA does not provide compensation for economic loss or
personal injury resulting from the release of hazardous substances so that state law must
govern such claims); Attorney General v. Thomas Solvent Co., 380 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Mich.
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nuisance claims for hazardous waste exposure also is confirmed by the
leniency that courts give to "traditional state remedies" so as not to upset the
balance between federal and state law. 26 Because of this leniency provided
to traditional state remedies, consideration of issues arising under the
Supremacy Clause starts with the assumption that historic police powers of
the states are not to be superseded by federal law unless it is the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.I27 The combination of the savings clause and
the fact that nuisance law is a traditional state remedy mandates the
assumption that CERCLA would not displace state tort claims in any cleanup
action without a clear intention to do so.
Statutory construction assists in determining whether Congress clearly
intended to preempt state tort claims once the PRP cleanup commences.
CERCLA requires that a PRP indemnify a contractor for liability from the
contractor's own negligence, as long as it is not willful or intentional, in
allowing the release of any hazardous substance arising out of response
action activities.'28 The PRP in turn is not allowed indemnification for such
negligence.'29 By requiring PRPs to indemnify a contractor for negligent
compliance of the remedial plan, CERCLA places the tort liability for
negligent implementation of a remedy on the PRP.' 30 However, given the
EPA's selection of the remedy and oversight of the cleanup, this provision
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that CERCLA provides that states may supplement any liability that
may be imposed under CERCLA). The Supreme Court determined that Superfund money
is not available to compensate private parties for harm resulting from discharge of hazardous
substances, making it clear that compensation for damages should be addressed by state,
rather than federal, law. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 375 (1986).
126 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1975) ("This assumption provides
assurance that 'the federal-state balance' . . . will not be disturbed unintentionally by
Congress or unnecessarily by the courts.").
127 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(c). The EPA also may indemnify the contractor hired by the PRP
for an amount that does not exceed the difference between the indemnification that the PRP
can afford and the amount necessary to provide the contractor with enough security to feel
comfortable to conduct the response action. See id.
129 See id. § 9619(d).
"0 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact that there
is no dispute that plaintiffs may recover under state law for negligent cleanup
implementation, although it is not clear from whom they may recover. The dispute centers
around whether a party could be held liable for CERCLA response costs for negligently
implementing a cleanup. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
1997] 439
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
makes no statement as to a PRP's liability for negligent remedy selection."'
Provisions in CERCLA that define its preemptive reach imply that
matters beyond that reach are not preempted.132  For example, section
9613(f)(2) of CERCLA states that a PRP that has entered into a judicially
approved settlement shall not be liable for claims of contribution from other
PRPs for CERCLA costs and damages. 13  If Congress intended to provide
absolute protection to PRPs that enter into consent decrees from state tort
liability, then the protection provision would include not only CERCLA costs
and damages, but also state tort claims.
The timing of challenges to a negligent remedy selection in RODs and
judicially approved consent decrees, however, leads to an opposite
conclusion of congressional intent. The statute provides for citizen suits, 34
but denies federal court jurisdiction for challenging the scope of remedies
until remedial actions are completed. 13S The scope of the citizen suit
provision, and its corresponding timing limitation, appears to be limited to
challenges that the chosen remedy violates CERCLA,1 36 including
CERCLA's mandate to protect public health, and thus does not necessarily
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(d).
132 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520.
133 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
114 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
"I See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990) (reviewing "plain language"
of § 9613(h)(4) and deciding that a remedy selection can only be challenged in court for
violating a provision of CERCLA once the remedy is completed). Legislative history
supports this view as well. Senator Thurmond commented on this provision on the Senate
floor:
This section is designed to preclude lawsuits by any person concerning
particular segments of the response action, as delineated by the records of
decision, until those segments of the response have been constructed and
given the chance to operate and demonstrate their effectiveness in meeting
the requirements of the act. Completion of all of the work set out in a
particular record of decision marks the first opportunity at which review
of that portion of the response action can occur.
132 CONG. REC. S14,929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). This
provision is in place to avoid the delays on cleanup implementation that such pre-cleanup
challenges would cause. See generally Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1558 (1 lth Cir.
1989).
136 See Cobum v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. CIV.A.88-0120, 1988 WL 120739 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
9, 1988) (holding that a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit
challenging that a chosen remedy is incompatible with CERCLA until the remedy is
completed).
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include tort claims. Although the provision does not seem to explicitly bar
pre-cleanup challenges to remedy selection under state tort law, it is difficult
to see how Congress could have intended that citizens not be able to
challenge the sufficiency of remedies for protecting human health under
CERCLA before the cleanup is finished but allow tort claims based on the
exact same theory before the cleanup is finished.'37
The legislative history behind SARA displays confusion on the
subject as well. Senator Mitchell stated that "[t]he conferees agreed that
some pre-implementation review would be provided so that citizens would
not be disadvantaged by having to wait until cleanup was complete.
Nuisance suits would, of course, be permitted at any time."138 Representative
Eckart disagreed with Senator Mitchell's assessment when he said that
"[s]tate laws are to be used as a source for remedy determinations under this
law, but in fact are preempted by it."' 39 The statute, both in its construction
and the history surrounding its enactment and subsequent amendments, does
not provide a satisfactory answer to the narrow preemption inquiry of this
Note.
B. Actual Conflict
The Supreme Court held that state law is preempted by federal law to
the extent that the two "actually conflict," regardless of congressional design
or intention. 40 An "actual conflict" exists if the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of federal
law. 14' Federal regulations, including both the authority to enter into consent
137 For a thorough discussion on actual conflict between federal and state law in this
context, see infra notes 140-69 and accompanying text.
.3 132 CONG. REC. S14,917 (emphasis added).
139 132 CONG. REC. H9574 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Eckart). It was also asserted
by Representative Eckart that statements made on the Senate floor, including the one made
by Senator Mitchell, did not truly reflect the sentiment of the conference committee. See id.
140 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
141 See id.; see also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) (stating that the inquiry is whether compliance with both federal and state
requirements is a physical impossibility).
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decrees 4 2 and the power to issue UAOs, possess the same degree of
preemptive power as a statute provided that the agency determination
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that are within
the agency's domain.143 The EPA is given clear regulatory authority in
CERCLA to set up proper remediation of hazardous waste sites in the form
of provisions to sign consent decrees with PRPs and to issue UAOs to
PRPs. 44
A number of courts have held that consent decrees pursuant to
CERCLA and RCRA145 sufficiently conflict with state law to warrant
preemption. 46  A private plaintiff in Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 1bught
injunctive relief under state nuisance and trespass laws to require greater
remedial measures than those included in a RCRA Consent Order presented
to the responsible party.1 48 The court found that the state tort claim was
preempted by the EPA consent order because it was impossible for the
defendant to comply with the two inconsistent procedures. 49 The holdings
in Feikema, United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc.," 0 and Hermes
Consolidated, Inc. v. People5' demonstrate that state tort suits brought for
injunctive relief are preempted if they call for remediation methods that are
inconsistent with procedures specified by the EPA in orders and consent
142 Once the consent decree is signed by the PRP, it is a fully enforceable federal judgment
that overrides any conflicting state law or state court order. See Badgley v. Santacroce, 800
F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the strong policy encouraging settlement of cases
requires that terms of a consent judgment, once approved by a federal court, be respected
as fully as a judgment entered after trial).
' See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
'44See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d) (1994).
145 A consent order under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, is similar to a UAO or consent decree
under CERCLA for the purposes of preemption analysis. See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,852
(1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 264). In fact, the case for preemption should be even
stronger under CERCLA because the EPA is more involved in CERCLA cleanups than it
is in RCRA cleanups. See id. at 30,798. For a thorough comparison of CERCLA and
RCRA, see generally John, supra note 3.
146 See, e.g., Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1419 (4th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991); Hermes Consol., Inc.
v. People, 849 P.2d 1302, 1307 (Wyo. 1993).
147 16 F.3d 1408 (4th Cir. 1994).
141 See id. at 1411.
49 See id. at 1416.
150 949 F.2d 1409 (6th Cir. 1991).
151 849 P.2d 1302 (Wyo. 1993).
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judgments.152 The court in Feikema did not extend the logic to preempt a tort
claim for monetary damages brought by the private party.'53 The concurring
judge in Feikema made a compelling argument, however, that injunctive
relief and monetary damages should not be split to determine federal
preemption of state tort law. 15 4 A claim for monetary damages alleging that
cleanup remedies are inadequate is based on the same theory that supports a
claim for injunctive relief to change the remedies to make them adequate.'55
When preemption prevents injunctive relief, it must foreclose a claim for
monetary damages as well because it is indirectly pursuing the same
theory.'56 Otherwise, it would be impossible for the defendant to avoid
paying monetary damages because it must follow the mandatory remedy
selected by the EPA that cannot be altered by suits for injunctive relief. The
EPA's inadequate remedy selection would automatically amount to a
successful damages suit against the PRP.
Feikema's holding that a state nuisance claim for monetary damages
is not preempted by the RCRA consent order may be misleading.' The
decision on damages was based on two reasons: first, that the order did not
52 In Hermes and Akzo Coatings, state governments brought suit challenging consent
decrees entered into between the EPA and the PRP and sought injunctive relief rather than
monetary damages. After the PRP in Hermes entered into a federal consent decree, the state
Department of Environmental Quality filed suit alleging that the operations of the facility
caused the discharge in violation of state law, and was denied a request that further
violations be enjoined through a state remediation plan. See id. at 1304. The state in Akzo
Coatings was denied its challenge to a state remediation plan drafted to ensure compliance
with state statutes and nuisance law because the court held that requiring the defendants to
comply with two different cleanup procedures on the site would be inconsistent. See Akzo
Coatings, 949 F.2d at 1458.
1' See Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416. Although Feikema is based on RCRA, rather than
CERCLA, the provisions at issue are very similar. See supra note 144.
"" See Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1418 (Mumaghan, J., concurring) (citing Supreme Court
decisions for the proposition that preemption analysis for claims of monetary damages is
consistent with preemption analysis for injunctive relief claims).
' See Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 469 (1984) (stating that a state law also is preempted if it interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach its goal).
156 See id.
' In fact, Judge Murnaghan's concurrence attempted to clarify the holding of the court
by stating that, in his view, preemption of a suit for injunctive relief also bars a suit for
monetary damages based on the theory that the use of an inadequate remedy caused a tort.
Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1417 (Mumaghan, J., concurring).
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consider damages to the plaintiff caused by the hazard of possessing the
hazardous substance;15 and, second, that the EPA is only authorized to seek
injunctive relief and not compensation for damages.'59 The second reason,
while true, should not overshadow the first. The key to understanding the
holding is to recognize the distinction between the tort of the improper
disposal or possession of a hazardous substance and the tort of negligently
removing the substance. 6 ' The PRP may be responsible for the underlying
hazardous waste, but the EPA is responsible for the remedy selection. 6'
Both torts may result in a viable nuisance claim, but they should be
distinguished so that the responsible party may be held liable. Otherwise, the
court would end up with the same result it sought to avoid by denying
injunctive relief.
In Feikema, the court's refusal to require that the defendant use
cleanup methods sought by the plaintiff that were different from the methods
specified by the EPA was based on the theory that the defendant could not
comply with the two different methodologies at the same time.'62 Exactly the
same result would have occurred if the plaintiff was permitted to sue for
monetary damages based on the theory that improper methods were used to
clean up the hazardous waste.'63 Regardless of the type of tort suit brought
by plaintiffs, the defendant is required by federal law by severe financial
penalties to comply with the methodology provided in the ROD. 64
Allowance of the suit for monetary damages would mean that the PRP could
then be held liable for failing to use methods that it was prevented by law
158 See 1993-94 Fourth Circuit Summary: Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 18 WM. & MARY J.
ENVTL. L. 415, 416 (1994).
159 See id.
161 The amount for damages for negligent remedy selection should equal the difference
between the monetary damages imposed on the plaintiff by the cleanup remedy required by
the EPA and the damages that would result from the cleanup remedy deemed necessary by
the tort plaintiff.
161 The PRP lacks any choice in the matter because the cleanup method in the ROD will
be carried out regardless of its participation. See generally Organ, supra note 6, at 1065-69.
If it declines to sign a consent decree, it is likely to face a UAO; if it declines to follow the
UAO, the EPA or another PRP will clean up the site according to the methodology in the
ROD. See id.
162 Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416.
163 See id. at 1418 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
6 See id. CERCLA expressly makes it illegal for a PRP to deviate from a consent decree
or UAO without EPA approval. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(6) (1994).
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from using.'65 Imposing a damage claim on the defendant would be a direct
usurpation of the EPA's statutory authority to determine which remedies are
adequate to protect human health and would conflict with a judicially
enforceable order. Simply put, "common-law damages actions are preempted
to the same extent as common-law injunctive suits."' 166
Plaintiffs in states with a negligence standard of culpability for
nuisance claims may find it even more difficult to rebut conventional PRP
defenses to environmental tort claims once this preemption is recognized. 67
Defendants would have an additional defense that it was the EPA's negligent
remedy selection that caused the nuisance rather than the underlying
hazardous waste. As courts tend to blur the distinction between negligence
and strict liability standards when dealing with hazardous substances,
however, the defendant likely will bear much of the burden of proving the
portion of the damage that was preempted and thus not recoverable from the
defendant. 161 More scientific information is becoming available to
differentiate between harm caused by the underlying waste and harm caused
by inadequate remedy selection. For example, the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry is required by CERCLA to study the effects
of a number of hazardous substances on humans and produce significant data
and information that could be used to show the effects of exposure to
hazardous waste before a cleanup is commenced. 69
C. Uniquely Federal Interest
The actual conflict between an EPA order to conduct a specified
remedy and a state tort claim for monetary damages alleging that the remedy
is inadequate is clear enough alone to warrant preemption of the tort claim.
The case for preemption is strengthened by an examination of the nature of
the federal interest involved. The extent of the conflict necessary for
preemption of state tort claims is lessened for issues that are of a "uniquely
161 See Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1418 (Mumaghan, J., concurring).
166 Id. (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
167 See COOKE, supra note 56, § 17.01[2][b][v][C].
168 See id. § 17.01[2][b][v][C]-.01[2][b][v][D].
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). In certain cases, medical care and testing must be provided
to exposed individuals. See id. § 9604(i)(1)(D).
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federal interest."' 7 ° If there is a federal interest at stake, federal courts have
the power to create federal common law to preempt state law, 7' such as tort
law, if there is a "significant conflict" between the federal policy or interest
and the operation of state law. 172
The nature of the interests at stake in CERCLA cleanups seem
analogous to others classified as "uniquely federal."' 73 First, the desire of
Congress to develop uniform methods to clean up hazardous waste shows
that cleanup methodology is an area that is uniquely federal. As stated in one
170 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988). The court stated that "the
fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise
be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can." Id. at 507-08 (emphasis
added).
171 See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). Courts are
also free to develop common law in areas where Congress expressly gave courts the power
to develop substantive law. See id. Courts are reluctant to develop federal common law that
would preempt state law except when Congress expressly provided courts with such power.
See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1962). The Supreme Court has
concluded that generally "it is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left" when the
creation of federal common law would preempt existing state law. Id. at 652 (emphasis
added). Nonetheless, a number of federal courts have applied federal common law in
CERCLA litigation because they decided that Congress intended that federal courts would
fill in gaps left by the statute. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988) (imposing successor liability for CERCLA liability on
corporations that have either merged or consolidated with a PRP despite a state incorporation
law to the contrary). See generally United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 n.8 (E.D.
Mo. 1987) (discussing in dicta the appropriateness of federal common law for deciding
CERCLA successor liability questions). In Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex
Corp., 851 F.2d 86, the court stated that "[t]he meager legislative history available [on
CERCLA] indicates that Congress. expected the courts to develop a federal common law to
supplement the statute." Id. at 91. However, preempting state tort claims is much different
than imposing successor liability. While the definition of PRP is consistent with successor
liability, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), the broad savings clause makes clear that generally state
tort claims are not to be preempted. See id. § 9614. Given this savings clause, courts are
not likely to find anything in the statute that expressly authorizes the development of federal
common law unless an actual conflict exists between federal and state law, as discussed
supra notes 140-169 and accompanying text, or unless the interests at stake in CERCLA
cleanups are uniquely federal and there is some accompanying conflict between federal and
state law.
172 See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
173 See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("The
improper disposal or release of hazardous substances is an enormous and complex problem
of national magnitude involving uniquely federal interests.").
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district court decision, "In attempting to eliminate the dangers of hazardous
wastes, CERCLA presents a national solution to a nationwide problem."174
Necessity for national uniformity within specific sub-categories related to
CERCLA has made courts hesitant to allow corresponding liability to depend
on the particular state in which the defendant happens to reside.' 75 Cleanup
methodology is one of the sub-categories of CERCLA that Congress intended
to leave to the EPA. Congress did not intend to allow plaintiffs to recover
from PRPs based on the theory that the remedy used to clean up hazardous
waste was inadequate. Although it is clear in the statute that state tort
liability is not preempted for torts caused before the cleanup begins, Congress
determined that remedy selection should ultimately be decided by the EPA
under the NCP and ROD processes. 176 Thus, because remedy selection is a
uniquely federal interest, tort damage recoveries against PRPs should be
preempted to the degree that they include liability for inadequate remedy
selection.
Second, courts should consider government contract cases when
developing federal common law on the preemption of state tort claims
stemming from remedy selection. There can be a unique federal interest
involved in a liability suit between private parties if it arises out of the
performance of a contract with the federal government. 177 However, a unique
federal interest is at stake only if the suit will directly affect the terms of
government contracts. 78 In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 179 a
uniquely federal interest was at stake in a tort suit against a producer of
military equipment for the federal government because the suit was based on
inadequate design by the government. 80 The Court held that if the
government contractor could be held liable for poor design by the
government, then the contractor would either raise its contract price or refuse
to agree to a contract with the government. 8' Either result would affect
174 In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D.
Mass. 1987).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(considering parent-subsidiary liability for hazardous waste cleanups under CERCLA).
176 See generally Organ, supra note 6, at 1055-56.
'"See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505.
178 See id. at 507.
179 Id. at 500.
8 0 See id. at 507.
181 See id.
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government contract terms enough to impede a uniquely federal interest.'
Similarly, a PRP may refuse to enter into a consent decree with the EPA to
clean up a site. A PRP does not have the negotiating leverage of a normal
government contractor in that the PRP can be ordered to conduct the cleanup
if it refuses to settle, but there is a strong federal interest in settling these
cases to commence cleanup quickly."8 3 If the PRP decides to settle or
receives a UAO, it would know that the method specified by the EPA may
not be sufficient to protect against tort claims. The PRP would then have no
opportunity to protect itself against tort liability because the EPA has
exclusive authority to determine which methods are necessary to protect
human health.'84 Under what is termed the "government contractor defense,"
government contractors are immune from tort liability in certain instances
where uniquely federal interests are at stake if the duty on the federal
government contractor is contrary to the duty that the suit attempts to apply
under state law. 85
The unique nature of the situation presented by this Note may link a
PRP's potential liability to that of a government contractor and make the
government contractor defense applicable.'86 Of course, the main problem
with such an analogy is the connection between the PRP and the hazardous
waste that needs to be cleaned up.'87 But as the holding in Iron Mountain
Mines, Inc. made clear, CERCLA does not require a tight connection in order
182 See id.
's See Organ, supra note 6, at 1057.
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994).
185 See generally Seymour, supra note 83.
'
86 This discussion is an application of the government contractor defense to the PRP. For
a discussion of the liabilities and indemnifications for an RAC, see supra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
187 In fact, at least one court found that the government contractor defense does not apply
when a defendant's actions, such as illegally discharging contaminants, violate both federal
environmental law and state tort law. See Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439,
447 (S.D. Ohio 1989). The defendant in Crawford operated a uranium plant owned by the
United States Department of Energy and was sued under tort law for environmental effects
of the plant. See id. at 441-42, 446-47. The defendant argued that it should be exempt from
tort liability because it specifically followed EPA specifications and orders. See id. at 445.
The court held that because the same actions violated both federal and state law, there was
no conflict between the two. See id. at 447. There being no conflict, the court held that the
government contractor defense was unavailable. See id.
[Vol. 21:421448
"SHOVELS FIRST AND LAWYERS LATER"
to be labeled a PRP.188 The court in Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. described the
following scenario: "CERCLA may impose liability on parties who had little
culpability in creating the contamination problem at issue. This is frequently
the case when a later owner becomes responsible for pollution released many
years earlier, sometimes under different technology and under different
industrial standards."' 89 Thus, once the cleanup begins, the loosely connected
PRP is essentially a government contractor for cleanup. Manufacturing
design is analogous to remedy selection. Culpability in remedy selection,
rather than production of hazardous waste, should drive liabilities stemming
from the consent decree or UAO.
Thus, a uniquely federal interest in such government contract cases
is at stake because of the EPA's design of the remedy. The conflict between
the federal interest in CERCLA cleanups and state tort law' 90 mandates that
the Boyle test be applied to determine if the government contractor defense
is applicable. 9 ' The Boyle test considers whether the federal government
approved "reasonably precise specifications" for the product.'92 The extent
that the contractor exercised discretion over the allegedly defective design
may be determinative as the defense clearly requires more than a "rubber
stamp" by the government agency. 193 A key distinction is made between
when the government delegates the design discretion to the contractor with
minimal or general standards and when the government actually chooses a
.88 See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1445 (E.D. Cal.
1995); see also Lisa A. Lee, Comments and Casenotes, Guilty for Having Done Nothing:
Passive Past Owners Face CERCLA Liability, I Mo. ENVTL.'L. & POL'Y REV. 88 (1993);
supra note 100 and accompanying text.
89 Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. at 1445-46.
0 For conflict analysis, see supra notes 140-69 and accompanying text.
'9 See Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 400, 423
(D.S.C. 1994).
192 See id. at 420. The Boyle test has two other elements. First, the work of the contractor
must conform with government specifications. See id. at 420, 423-24. It is clear that a PRP
should be held liable in state tort claims if its failure to follow the specifications provided
by the EPA results in personal harm or property damage. Second, the contractor must have
warned the federal government about any dangers involved in the specifications of which
the government agency was not aware. See id. at 420. Likewise, any failure of the PRP to
inform the EPA of unaware dangers should go towards a negligence standard of culpability
in a state tort claim. In either instance, even the broadest application of the government
contractor defense should not apply to the PRP faced with a state nuisance or trespass claim.
' See Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989).
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design feature. 94 The government contractor defense is inapplicable when
the extent of government involvement is an exercise of the right of final
approval over design specifications.'95 The court in Trevino v. General
Dynamics Corp.'96 made the point that if the contractor has discretion to
deviate from the government's specifications, then discretion over the design
choices is exercised by the contractor, not the government.
97
Other courts, however, do not find that contractor participation blocks
the application of the government contractor defense. Government approval
is implicit when the agency is intimately involved at various stages of the
design and development process.'98 Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. 199 considered a "continuous exchange" between the contractor and the
government as the dispositive factor of the first prong of the Boyle test.2 °°
The back and forth discussions between the government agency and its
contractor in the review and acceptance of final design plans constituted the
requisite "continuous exchange."201
Such a description of a continuous exchange is particularly analogous
to remedy selection for hazardous waste cleanup.20 2 Provisions in the Model
Consent Decree display a continuous exchange.20 3 Monthly meetings and
continuous progress reports are required.2" The court in Kleemann relied on
the fact that government involvement in the process makes it more likely that
information is shared with respect to the potential dangers associated with the
result of the contract.0 5 Awareness of potential damages is the primary
responsibility of the EPA in any hazardous waste cleanup as the EPA is
specifically tasked with ensuring that human health and the environment are
protected.20 6 Thus, the PRP/EPA relationship in a CERCLA cleanup
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 Id. at 1474.
'9' See id. at 1481.
'19 See Kleemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 F.2d 698, 701 (4th Cir. 1989).
'99 See id. at 698.
200 See id. at 702.
2'0 See id.
202 For a discussion of the cleanup process and continuous exchange involved in the EPA's
supervision of sites, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
203 See Revised Model CERCLA RD/RA Consent Decree, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,817 (1995).
204 See id. at 38,826.
205 See Kleemann, 890 F.2d at 701.
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(c) (1994).
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mandates a broad application of the government contractor defense springing
from a unique federal interest in hazardous waste cleanups. The "uniquely
federal interest" analysis confirms the "actual conflict" conclusion that the
PRP is immune from state tort claims charging that the PRP negligently used
an inadequate remedy to clean up a CERCLA hazardous waste site.
Nonetheless, at least one court has failed to recognize this conflict.2"7 As a
result, PRPs, unsure of the status of the law and unwilling to face litigation
risks, have been forced to settle with tort plaintiffs for negligent remedy
selection by the EPA.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Congress may pass a reauthorization bill that will reform CERCLA
in a number of ways.20 8 The starting point for congressional consideration is
likely to be the "Reform of Superfund Act of 1995," introduced in October
1995 by Representative Michael Oxley (R-OH).2 °9 The bill would do nothing
to resolve the conflict between federal cleanup standards and state tort law as
it provides for "exclusive" federal cleanup remedies but does not amend the
broad savings clause.2"0 One focus of the bill is to change aspects of remedy
selection and implementation.2" The general standard for remedy selection
would be that "[r]emedies ... shall be those necessary to protect human
207 See Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1416 (4th Cir. 1994).
208 See Gary Lee, GOP Pushes Superfund Rewrite; Democrats Say Plan Would Free
Industry from Cleanup Responsibility, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1995, at A9.
209 H.R. 2500, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill was delayed in part because of a desire by
Congressional Republicans to avoid giving Democrats a campaign issue in 1996. See
Abrams, supra note 30, at 581 n.8.210 See H.R. 2500 § 102. The bill provides that "the standards set forth in this section shall
govern the degree of cleanup, remedy selection, and on-site management of hazardous
substances in lieu of any other Federal, State or local standards." Id. (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621 (1994)).
211 See id. Factors to be considered in evaluating potential remedial action would include
anticipated future uses of land, technical feasibility, and reasonableness of costs. See id.
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f) (1994)). The EPA would be required to demonstrate and
certify that the selected remedy represents a cost-effective risk reduction and that the
incremental cost of the chosen alternative is justified and reasonably related to the
incremental risk reduction benefits of the remedy. See id. Other prominent provisions not
related to remedy selection include liability exemptions for certain sites created before 1987
and government refunds to private companies conducting cleanups. See Lee, supra note
208, at A9.
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health and the environment from realistic and significant risks through cost-
effective and cost-reasonable means." '212 The bill proposes a system of
generic remedies and waivers that are designed to create a "results-oriented
approach." '213
A more fundamental results-oriented approach is necessary to create
a system of incentives that will ensure the dual purposes of efficient
hazardous waste cleanup and victim compensation for environmental torts
such as nuisance and trespass. The bill, as does the law itself, seems
purposely ambivalent to the inherent conflict between the federally mandated
cleanup methods and state tort claims based on negligent remedy selection.
A CERCLA reform bill should contain more threshold changes to the law to
hold the EPA responsible under tort law for its remedy selection
responsibilities and to offer incentives to PRPs to choose their own remedies
and conduct their own cleanups. Such a policy avoids holding the PRP liable
for the EPA's mistakes and allows the PRP flexibility in determining the best
way to clean up hazardous waste to avoid affecting others.
A. Waiver of EPA 's Sovereign Immunity
The bill should codify the holding in Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. that
CERCLA waives sovereign immunity for CERCLA costs and damages when
the EPA takes over a site for cleanup and becomes the "owner or operator"
for purposes of CERCLA liability. For the reasons outlined in this Note,
contrary interpretations by other courts are misguided. Further, this Note
demonstrates that the EPA is protected by sovereign immunity from tort
claims when it takes over a site under the discretionary acts exception to the
FTCA, and as a result, such sovereign immunity should be explicitly waived
with respect to torts that stem from the cleanup of the site. Thus, the EPA
would be responsible under tort law for the decisions it makes with respect
to hazardous waste cleanups. This proposal is an extension of the idea behind
the EPA's current authority to indemnify contractors for tort claims brought
for negligent remedy implementation. 14 This proposal takes this idea further,
making it possible for plaintiffs to sue the EPA for negligent remedy
selection. Waiver is necessary because the law, as correctly applied, offers
212 H.R. 2500 § 102 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1994)).
213 Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 9621(h) (1994)).
214 See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(a)(2) (1994).
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the victim of the mishandling of hazardous waste no compensation for
improper remedy selection. There would still be the problem of allocating
responsibility between the underlying hazardous waste and the EPA cleanup,
but information is improving and, at the least, the victim would have a chance
to recover damages for the improper cleanup of hazardous waste sites.
The potential for huge tort claims against the EPA would force the
EPA to select and implement the most health-protective, and thus the most
expensive, remedy methods. Since PRPs must reimburse the EPA for these
expensive costs,215 PRPs would be presented with huge incentives to clean up
the site itself to avoid such high costs. This proposal will amplify the effect
of cost incentives in encouraging PRPs to get involved early in the consent
decree process.2"6 There remains the problem of a PRP with relatively little
culpability facing the choice of entering into a consent decree or being held
jointly and severally liable for these higher contribution costs incurred by the
EPA. Such a PRP, however, would rather face these choices than be held
liable for large tort settlements because of remedy selection mistakes made
by the EPA.
B. Results-Oriented Consent Decrees and UAOs
The bill should require the EPA to develop a revised Model Consent
Decree and to use UAOs that provide PRPs with specific hazardous waste
levels and timetables that must be met. If the timetables are not met, the EPA
should be able to take over the cleanup efforts and levy large penalties and
damages. A results-oriented approach would remove the preemption
problems considered at length in this Note. The EPA would no longer
mandate under penalty of federal law that a specified cleanup method be
used. This approach allows PRPs to discover cost-effective ways to meet
required thresholds with the additional knowledge that they face potential tort
liability for selecting and implementing adequate cleanup methods. Reliance
would be placed on tort claims, rather than on the EPA, to ensure that the
remedies do not endanger public health. The EPA's primary role would be
to set proper threshold amounts of hazardous waste and timetables for
cleanup.
PRPs conducting cleanups could still sue other PRPs for cleanup cost
213 This includes cleanup costs but not tort liability damages.
216 See John, supra note 3, at 971-72.
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contribution but would be alone in facing potential tort liability for remedy
selection. Of course, the same damage allocation problem would exist as
under the current system because PRPs liable for inadequately selecting or
implementing a remedy would not necessarily be liable for torts based on the
underlying waste. Damages for torts based on underlying hazardous waste
would still be allocated according to traditional tort law.
Also, the results-oriented approach would positively counter other
CERCLA problems not addressed in this Note, such as the likely significant
decrease of EPA funding for CERCLA enforcement2 7 and delays in
successful cleanup implementation. 2 8 The proposal would provide a revenue
source from the penalties and a significant incentive to meet the required
thresholds, while at the same time balancing the risk of state tort claims.
Such a proposal reaches the main goals of CERCLA by mandating necessary
cleanups while leaving tort claims to state law, and it does so with
increasingly politically popular market-based incentives.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort claims brought by victims of hazardous waste cleanups against
PRPs are preempted by CERCLA to the extent that they are based on
negligent remedy selection or implementation by the EPA. When the EPA
takes over a hazardous waste site, claims against the PRP based on the
cleanup should be preempted because the PRP is not involved. When the
PRP conducts the cleanup according to the methods specified by the EPA,
claims against the PRP based on the cleanup should be preempted to the
extent that they are based on negligent remedy selection. This preemption,
while not recognized by all courts, is based on the actual conflict that exists
between PRP compliance with EPA mandated remediation procedures and
tort claims brought against the PRP alleging that its cleanup method was
inadequate. Recognition of this preemption requires that damages be
allocated according to whether they were caused by underlying hazardous
waste or negligent remedy selection and implementation. In addition to
properly allocating respective fault in these tort claims, CERCLA should be
amended to waive the EPA's sovereign immunity when designing and
implementing cleanups. CERCLA also should be amended to require the
217 See Lee, supra note 188, at A9.
218 See id.
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EPA to produce results-oriented consent decrees and UAOs to avoid cleanup
preemption problems when a PRP conducts the cleanup. The combination
of the cost incentive brought by the immunity waiver and new results-
oriented mandates from the EPA will result in a more efficient balancing of
cleanup costs and potential tort claims in cleanup decisions.
